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The Australia–India  
Framework for Security Cooperation:  
Another Step Towards an Indo-Pacific 
Security Partnership 
David Brewster 
Narendra Modi’s visit to Australia in November 2014 and his fanfare address 
to the Australian Parliament was accompanied by much discussion of a 
“natural partnership” between the two countries.  The visit was a significant 
step forward in a relationship that could one day become an important part of 
Australia’s overall strategic posture.  One of the most substantive 
achievements of the visit was the conclusion of a Framework for Security 
Cooperation setting out an Action Plan for a more comprehensive security and 
defence relationship.  The Framework signals an intention on both sides to 
intensify the Australia-India security engagement and take it into some 
important new areas.   
This comment gives an overview of recent developments in the Australia-India 
security and defence relationship.  It then examines the terms of the 
Framework, focusing on new areas of cooperation set out in the Framework.  
The comment then considers how the relationship will likely develop in coming 
years. 
Recent Developments in the Strategic Relationship  
The changing balance of power in the Indo-Pacific—and particularly the 
emergence of both China and India as major powers—is forcing India and 
Australia to engage on security and defence issues much more than ever 
before.  The relationship has gone through many ups and downs since India’s 
Independence in 1947, often reflecting quite different ideological orientations 
and strategic perspectives—for several reasons neither country saw the other 
as a key strategic partner.1  Australia has pursued the relationship with some 
enthusiasm over the last decade or so, but it is only recently that India has 
been prepared to engage on a more substantive level.  The Modi Government 
is now showing much greater enthusiasm for building a substantive security 
and defence partnership with Australia. 
Developments in the Australia-India strategic relationship are part of a multi-
decade evolution of India’s relations with several Asia-Pacific powers.  Since 
                                                                
1 See David Brewster, India as an Asia Pacific Power (London: Routledge, 2012), pp. 119-33. 
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the 1990s, as part of its “Look East” policy (now re-badged its “Act East” 
policy), India has given considerable economic, political and strategic focus to 
East Asia.  This has included developing improved security relationships with 
key partners such as Vietnam and Singapore.2  India’s relationship with the 
United States has also steadily improved over the last decade or so, 
particularly after Washington granted India de facto recognition as a nuclear 
weapons state, which opened the way for a significant expansion of military 
and security engagements.  India’s security relationship with Japan is also on 
the upswing, particularly since 2007, with the two countries increasingly 
seeing each other as poles in an emerging axis focused on balancing against 
China. 
India’s relationship with Australia has followed a similar trajectory.  In 2009, 
India and Australia declared that they were “strategic partners”, signalling an 
intention to develop a closer and more comprehensive relationship.  There 
has been significant growth in trade over the last decade and in 2012-13, 
bilateral merchandise and services trade stood at A$16.6 billion—although the 
value of exports to India had dropped over the past couple of years due to the 
fall in commodity prices.  A Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Agreement (CECA) has been under negotiation for some time that has the 
potential to yield huge gains to both the Australian and Indian economies.3  It 
was agreed during Modi’s visit in November 2014 to accelerate negotiations 
on the CECA, and in early 2015 there were ambitious claims that negotiations 
may be finalised this year.4  However, based on India’s other concluded free 
trade agreements (FTA) and its progress on negotiations of many others, it 
seems unlikely that India would be willing to open up key markets (say in 
agriculture) to Australian products although greater progress may be made in 
investment and services. The CECA is therefore unlikely to produce economic 
benefits to Australia in the nature or scale of those provided by its recent FTA 
with China.  Overall, an Australia-India CECA, if and when concluded, may be 
an important step forward in the relationship, but it may have more political 
significance than immediate economic substance.  
Australia has paid considerable attention to improving the defence and 
security relationship with India over the last decade, with a focus on creating 
opportunities for engagement among political leaders, and civil and military 
officials.  Regular security or defence engagements now include annual 
meetings of Foreign Ministers, regular meetings of Defence Ministers, annual 
Defence Policy Talks, an Australia-India Maritime Security Operations 
Working Group, regular staff talks between senior officers of each of the 
                                                                
2 See generally, Danielle Rajaratnam, ‘India's new Asia-Pacific strategy: “Act East”’, Lowy 
Interpreter, 18 December 2014, < http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2014/12/18/Indias-new-
Asia-Pacific-strategy-Act-East.aspx?COLLCC=3624601532&> [Accessed 25 February 2015].  
3 Australia-India Joint Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Feasibility Study, available at 
<http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/aifta/Australia-India-Joint-FTA-Feasibility-Study.html>  
4 Nayanima Basu, ‘India, Australia CECA Talks Hit Farm Hurdle’, Business Standard, 17 
January 2015. 
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armed services and several 1.5 track roundtables.  Over the last decade or so 
there has also been a series of bilateral agreements on terrorism, defence 
cooperation, information sharing and extradition, and a 2009 Joint Declaration 
on Security Cooperation, which was a non-binding declaration intended to 
create a framework for the further security cooperation.5  In recent years there 
has also been much greater cooperation in regional organisations such as the 
Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the Indian Ocean Naval 
Symposium (IONS), which are potentially important (if limited) forums for 
dialogue on security related issues in the Indian Ocean region.   
Much of the impetus for bilateral engagement has so far come from Canberra.  
Although this has not been wholly unrequited, Delhi’s response has been 
constrained by several factors.  These include political irritations (attacks on 
Indian students; the uranium issue), ideological constraints (a continuing 
emotional attachment among some in Delhi to the ideal of nonalignment and 
associated suspicions of America and US allies) and bureaucratic inertia 
(Indian bureaucrats are world famous for their predilection for saying no).6  As 
a result, the security and defence relationship has developed largely at the 
political or rhetorical level and practical or operational engagement between 
the respective armed forces and other government agencies has been limited.  
For example, although India’s agreement to hold bilateral naval exercises with 
Australia from 2015 is a welcome development, it must be measured against 
the fact that the Indian Navy already conducts regular bilateral exercises (or 
similar operations) with at least eight other navies.  
The 2014 Framework reflects a relatively recent sea change in Delhi’s view of 
Australia as an important regional partner.  The visit of Tony Abbott to Delhi 
in September 2014 effectively cleared away uranium as an issue that had 
considerable symbolic importance to India.7  The election of the Modi 
Government in May 2014 has also reduced Delhi’s residual attachment to 
non-alignment that inhibited India’s ability to fully engage with countries such 
as Australia.  Modi has demonstrated a much greater confidence than the 
previous Indian government in operationalising India’s new defence and 
security relationships throughout the Indo-Pacific region. 
                                                                
5 For a detailed discussion of the Australia-India Security Declaration, see David Brewster, ‘The 
Australia–India Security Declaration: The Quadrilateral Redux?’ Security Challenges, vol. 6, 
no.1 (Autumn 2010), pp. 1-9. 
6 These constraints are explored in detail in David Brewster, ‘The India-Australia Security and 
Defence Relationship: Developments, Constraints and Prospects’, Security Challenges, vol. 10, 
no.1 (2014), pp. 65-86. 
7 Although there are considerable hesitations among informed observers over the terms of the 
draft agreement.  See John Carlson, ‘Is the Abbott Government Abandoning Australia’s Nuclear 
Safeguards Standards for India?’ Lowy Interpreter, 1 October 2014. 
David Brewster 
- 42 - 
A Look at the 2014 Australia-India Framework  
The Framework consists of an Action Plan for cooperation in the following 
areas:   
 annual summit and foreign policy exchanges and coordination;  
 defence policy planning and coordination;  
 counter-terrorism and other transnational crimes; 
 border protection, coast guard and customs; 
 disarmament, non-proliferation, civil nuclear energy and maritime 
security; 
 disaster management and peacekeeping; and 
 cooperation in regional and multilateral fora.  
Consistent with previous agreements, the Action Plan lists existing bilateral 
engagements and mechanisms for cooperation.  This now includes a 
commitment to annual meetings of Prime Ministers (although not necessarily 
annual visits).  It also lists the multilateral forums where Australia and India 
can work together, including the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum, 
ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+), the Indian Ocean Rim 
Association (IORA), Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), the United 
Nations and the G20.  Importantly, the Action Plan covers new areas of 
defence and security cooperation not covered in detail or at all in the 2007 
Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation.  These new or enhanced areas are 
discussed in greater detail below:   
COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION 
The Action Plan gives considerable focus to cooperation in counter-terrorism, 
and identifies the following engagements or areas of cooperation: 
 annual Joint Working Group on Counter Terrorism and other 
Transnational Crimes; 
 cooperation in counter-terrorism training and exchanges between 
experts on countering improvised explosive devices, bomb incidents 
and technologies; 
 exchanges on counter-radicalisation; 
 cooperation between police on investigation of transnational crime; 
 cooperation on extradition and mutual legal assistance requests; 
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 cooperation between AUSTRAC and Financial Intelligence Unit-India; 
 exchanges on cyber policy and cooperation between CERT India and 
CERT Australia; and 
 cooperation on combating illegal migration. 
A greater public focus on counter-terrorism may in part reflect the rise of ISIS 
and concerns about Australian and Indian nationals participating in the 
Syria/Iraq civil wars.  Ways of responding to Islamic radicalisation could well 
be an area that Australia could learn from India.8  Both sides are also in the 
process of establishing cyber security organisations:  the Australian Cyber 
Security Centre was opened in December 2014, while India is establishing a 
separate armed forces Cyber Command, probably led by the Indian Navy.  
COOPERATION IN DEFENCE TECHNOLOGY 
A completely new area addressed by the Action Plan is cooperation in defence 
research and development, including through visits by Australian and Indian 
defence material delegations and efforts to foster joint industry links.  Although 
this has previously been given a low profile in the relationship, some see 
defence technology as a potential important area of cooperation.  Defence 
technology certainly has been an important plank in India’s relationships with 
the Soviet Union/Russia, France, Israel, and the United States and 
increasingly also other regional partners.  Delhi is currently negotiating the 
US$1.65 billion acquisition of US-2 amphibious aircraft from Japan as part of 
an enhanced strategic partnership with Tokyo.  Delhi has also recently 
requested that Japan consider offering its Soryu class submarines as part of 
India’s new submarine project.9  Access to defence technology is certainly 
something that gets Delhi’s attention.   
Australia has strengths in several areas that are of interest to India.  These 
include radar technologies and technologies with undersea applications and 
naval shipbuilding.  But there are reasons for caution in trying to use Australian 
defence exports to enhance the relationship.  The most significant is the 
parlous state of India’s defence procurement system, which despite some 
reforms under the Modi Government, remains Byzantine, dysfunctional and 
riddled with corruption.  This creates significant risks for Australian defence 
suppliers hoping to do business in India.  In theory, there is considerable 
scope for direct cooperation between the government defence research 
                                                                
8 Despite India having a population of some 140 million Muslims, Indian security sources claim 
that perhaps 10-20 Indian nationals have joined ISIS and related groups, compared with some 
estimates of more than 100 Australian nationals.   
9 Rahul Bedi, ‘India Asks Japan to Offer Soryu Subs for Project 75I requirement’, IHS Jane's 
Defence Weekly, 29 January 2015.  Some Indian commentators have raised the possibility of 
trilateral arrangements to build Soryu submarines, including Australia. 
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organisations, India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation 
(DRDO) and Australia’s Defence Science and Technology Organisation 
(DSTO), but again there are also some significant complications, not least 
being the DRDO’s role as both an R&D organisation and a manufacturer.  
Given the high level of dysfunction and delays commonly associated with 
Indian defence research, development and production, Australia may be very 
cautious in developing this aspect of the relationship.  
Some also may question the overall wisdom of using defence technology 
cooperation as a means of developing a closer security relationship.  India has 
resisted attempts by defence technology partners such as the former Soviet 
Union and currently the United States to leverage defence sales into a broader 
defence relationship.  The Indian military tends to see defence technology 
procurement as quite separate from a broader defence relationship and is 
resistant to allowing equipment acquisitions to be used as a reason for 
operational cooperation.  A defence procurement relationship with India, even 
by major powers, can be a cause of considerable irritations in the bilateral 
relationship.   
COOPERATION IN BORDER PROTECTION 
The Action Plan also provides commitments to cooperation in border 
protection, coast guard, and customs.  This is likely to be an increasingly 
important area of interaction.  The need for greater cooperation in border 
protection issues was brought to the fore in July 2014, when two boatloads of 
ethnic Tamil asylum seekers were intercepted by Australian authorities in 
international waters.  Unlike previous cases, these boats had departed India 
rather than Sri Lanka and it was not clear whether the passengers were of Sri 
Lankan or Indian nationality.  Australian authorities forcibly returned the first 
boat to Sri Lanka.  After prolonged negotiations with Delhi, Canberra 
grudgingly agreed to bring the second boatload of 157 asylum-seekers to 
mainland Australia to facilitate access by Indian consular officials.  The 
Australian Government was then forced to back off attempts to return the 
second boatload of asylum seekers to India after Delhi indicated that it would 
not be a party to forced repatriations.   
While both sides were able to avoid this incident creating irritations in the 
broader relationship, it clearly pointed to a need for enhanced cooperation 
between Australian and Indian authorities in responding to unregulated 
population movements.  In coming years we are also likely to see much 
greater use of coast guard authorities to enforce maritime security and 
maritime claims throughout the Indo-Pacific region.  China, for example, 
regularly uses coast guard or quasi-civilian vessels in demonstrations of its 
territorial claims in the South China Sea.  The potential for practical 
cooperation between Australian and Indian border protection authorities was 
underlined by the visit of an Indian Coast Guard vessel to Darwin in December 
2014, the first such visit of the Indian Coast Guard to Australian waters.  
Australia, with the support of Japan and India, is also seeking membership of 
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the Heads of Asian Coast Guards Agency (HACGA) meeting (the coast guard 
equivalent to the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and the Western 
Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS)).  The HACGA is likely to become a much 
more prominent forum for regional interaction on maritime security issues.  
CO-OPERATION IN EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES 
Another area of emphasis in the Framework Agreement is on disarmament 
and non-proliferation.  The agreement includes commitments to hold an 
annual bilateral dialogue on Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and International 
Security and, importantly, includes a pledge by Australia to support Indian 
membership of various international export control regimes.   
The most well known of these regimes is the Nuclear Suppliers Group (a 
grouping of some forty-seven states that supply nuclear materials and 
technology).10  Other export control groupings include the Australia Group (a 
grouping of some forty-one states and international organisations that 
collaborate to prevent the abuse of dual-use technology and materials for 
chemical and biological weapons programs), the Missile Technology Control 
Regime (a grouping of thirty-four states to prevent the proliferation of missile 
technologies with a range above 400 kilometres) and the Wassenaar 
Arrangement (an arrangement among forty-one states aimed at non-
proliferation of conventional arms and dual use goods).  These regimes had 
their genesis in Cold War era attempts to restrict Soviet access to weapons-
related technology.  Although the former Cold War foes, Russia and China, 
are full members of several of these groupings,11 India is a member of none 
of them.  This reflects India’s stance against the “unfairness” of the 
international nuclear non-proliferation treaty which prohibited any states other 
than Permanent 5 from owning nuclear weapons, and Delhi’s traditional deep 
suspicions of international regimes that restrict the transfer of technology.  
Although Delhi is now coming to understand the value of these regimes in 
maintaining international security it now finds itself on the outer.  Australia, as 
an active participant in several of these groupings can play an important role 
in helping to negotiate India’s membership, which would require a consensus 
among existing members.  Australia is already lobbying members of the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group to grant India entry as a full member, even though it 
is outside the nuclear non-proliferation regime.  As chair of the Australia 
Group, Australia can also play an important role in facilitating India’s entry into 
that grouping.  The Australia Group may be a logical place to begin India’s 
formal entry into the global export control network, because it is not connected 
to any residual sensitivities about nuclear issues.  Given India’s massive 
                                                                
10 Which was actually established in response to India’s first nuclear weapons test in 1974. 
11 China is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and voluntarily abides by the Missile 
Technology Control Regime.  Russia is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the 
Wassenaar Arrangement and the Missile Technology Control Regime. 
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chemical industry and the growing biotechnology sector, the absence of India 
from the export control regime is unsustainable.12 
SEARCH AND RESCUE 
The Action Plan also commits to greater cooperation between Australian and 
Indian agencies with responsibilities for international search and rescue 
(SAR), including through information exchange and regional dialogue.  The 
strategic significance of international search and rescue operations came to 
public attention in early 2014, when Australia took a leading role in the search 
for the missing Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 in the Indian Ocean.    
Australia’s commitment of significant resources to the search effort was a 
powerful statement of its role in the region.  Delhi (for apparently obscure 
bureaucratic reasons) chose not to participate in the multilateral search being 
conducted out of Perth, unlike China, which contributed considerable air and 
maritime assets.  Indian commentators such as Raja Mohan saw this as a 
mistake.13  A decade ago, Delhi recognised the geopolitical significance of 
Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations in the aftermath of the 
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.  The inclusion of SAR in the Action Plan may 
indicate that Delhi now better understands the political significance of SAR. 
COOPERATION IN HADR AND PEACEKEEPING 
The Action Plan also includes commitments for greater cooperation in HADR, 
collaboration in the East Asia Summit on disaster management; and 
cooperation and exchanges on peacekeeping issues, including between 
peacekeeping institutions.  Disaster management and peacekeeping are low-
hanging fruit—while they sit at the “soft” end of the spectrum of security 
cooperation, they can be very useful ways to develop personal relationships 
and inter-operability and provide an opportunity to generate significant 
goodwill.14   
India’s work with Australia, the United States and Japan in the multilateral 
naval response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami is often seen as a turning 
point in Delhi’s understanding of the benefits of cooperation with other 
maritime democracies in the Asia Pacific.  The response contributed directly 
to much improved relationships between the Indian Navy and the navies of 
Japan and Australia and the United States.  The episode was an important 
lesson in the potentially broader strategic consequences of cooperation in 
HADR. 
                                                                
12 Lisa Curtis, Walter Lohman, Rory Medcalf, Lydia Powell, Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and 
Andrew Shearer, Shared Goals, Converging Interests: A Plan for U.S.–Australia–India 
Cooperation in the Indo–Pacific, The Heritage Foundation, Lowy Institute and Observer 
Research Foundation, 3 November 2011, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/11/ 
shared-goals-converging-interests-a-plan-for-u-s-australia-india-cooperation-in-the-indo-pacific> 
[Accessed 25 February 2015]. 
13 C. Raja Mohan, ‘Chinese Takeaway: PLA Goes Out’, Indian Express, 26 March 2014. 
14  Brewster, ‘The India-Australia Security and Defence Relationship’. 
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There is much room for India and Australia and other Indian Ocean states to 
work together in HADR.  For example, India and Australia could work together 
to develop a system for responding to natural disasters in the Indian Ocean 
region similar to the FRANZ trilateral cooperation arrangement in the South 
Pacific which helps Australia, France, and New Zealand and others to 
coordinate their relief operations after cyclones and other natural disasters.15  
Australia is increasingly focussing on cooperation with Indian Ocean partners 
such as Indonesia in disaster relief and India could well become another 
partner in that cooperation.  The acquisition by the Australian Navy of the two 
huge Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) ships, HMAS Canberra and HMAS 
Adelaide, means that Australia’s contributions to regional disaster relief are 
only likely to increase in coming years.  
Peacekeeping operations can also provide a useful locus for cooperation, 
particularly between the respective armies.  In addition to building institutional 
relationships, cooperation in peacekeeping training would demonstrate India’s 
and Australia’s shared commitment to the UN and international stability.  Both 
countries have long been contributors to peacekeeping: since the end of 
World War II, India has contributed more than 100,000 personnel to some forty 
UN peacekeeping operations with more than 100,000 personnel, while 
Australia has contributed more than 30,000 personnel to some 100 peace 
operations.  India operates the Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping in 
New Delhi, which also provides the Secretariat of the International Association 
of Peacekeeping Training Centres.  Australia and India have previously 
exchanged students and instructors to their peacekeeping training centres on 
an ad hoc basis but more focused cooperation in peacekeeping training is 
possible and the potential for bilateral peacekeeping exercises can also be 
explored.   
What is the Significance of the Framework? 
The Framework for Security Cooperation is a significant development in 
several ways.  It represents an intention to intensify the engagements that 
have been developing over the last decade or so.  Importantly, it also signifies 
an intention to broaden the defence and security relationship to new areas 
and enhance cooperation in existing areas.  It may also indicate a desire by 
the Modi Government to move past some of India’s previous inhibitions in the 
defence relationship with Australia.  How effectively that is communicated to 
the powerful Indian bureaucracy, particularly the Ministry of External Affairs 
and the Ministry of Defence, remains to be seen.  The implications for Australia 
of the appointment of Manohar Parrikar as Indian Defence Minister in 
November 2014 are not yet clear, although at least India now has a full time 
Defence Minister who may be able to drive institutional change.  The recent 
                                                                
15 Future Directions International, ‘Strategic Objectives of the United States in the Indian Ocean 
Region’, Workshop Report, 29 September 2011, <www.futuredirections.org.au/publications/ 
workshop-papers/248-strategic-objectives-of-the-united-states-in-the-indian-ocean-region.html> 
[Accessed 24 February 2015]. 
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appointment of S. Jaishankar as Indian Foreign Secretary may also indicate 
a wish by the Modi Government to put a more realist stamp on foreign policy.  
In any event, there has definitely been a palpable change over the last couple 
of years in the tone of India-Australia defence relations.  The Framework may 
therefore represent an important step in the difficult task of moving the 
Australia-India partnership past rhetoric to the operational level.  If the 
engagement continues, the relationship could become an important pillar in 
Australia’s strategic posture, and indeed potentially a pillar of regional security 
architecture in the Indo-Pacific. 
The Framework should also be seen as another step in India’s expanding 
network of security relationships in the region.  The Modi Government does 
not appear to be averse to developing minilateral security arrangements with 
large and small powers.  India is currently exploring maritime security 
arrangements with various smaller Indian Ocean states, including with Sri 
Lanka, the Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles and has expressed a desire to 
develop multilateral arrangements in the Bay of Bengal.16  The status of 
existing trilateral security dialogue among India, Japan and the United States, 
which is currently held at additional secretary level, may be upgraded.  At the 
time of writing, a new trilateral security dialogue among India, Japan and 
Australia may also be on the cards, which would have considerable symbolic 
importance, but also perhaps practical consequences for cooperation in 
maritime security and defence technology.  A renewed quadrilateral dialogue 
including the United States may not be out of the question. 
Another interesting factor is the interplay between Australia’s growing 
partnership with India and Australia’s relationship with China.  The India-
Australia Framework was announced on 18 November 2014, the day after the 
announcement of the finalisation of the terms of a comprehensive trade 
agreement between China and Australia.  The China trade agreement is the 
first such agreement between China and a major developed country, and is 
widely viewed to be on favourable terms to Australia.  Chinese President Xi 
Jingping addressed the Australian Parliament the day before Mr Modi made 
an address, urging Australia to embrace a ‘harmonious’ partnership with 
Beijing.  China’s response to the growing Australia-India defence partnership 
seems to be an even closer economic embrace of Australia, an approach that 
contrasts sharply with the hostile rhetoric that emanated from Beijing in 2007 
after the announcement of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue among 
Australia, India, Japan and the United States.  Perhaps Beijing has decided 
that economic interests of its Indo-Pacific partners will ultimately trump 
security alignments. 
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16 Sandeep Dikshit, ‘Seychelles, Mauritius Join Indian Ocean Maritime Security Group’, The 
Hindu, 7 March 2014. 
